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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 05/03/2011 Accident number: 633 
Accident time: 07:55 Accident Date: 09/06/2009 
Where it occurred: AF12008/003241H453
3-8, Kandak-e-921 
Sarhadi area, Kohsan 
District, Herat Province
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 30/06/2009 
ID original source: OPS/14/01-11: Ref: 
09,06,199 
Name of source: UMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded) Ground condition: not recorded 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 05/03/2011 
No of victims: 2 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
Inadequate detector pinpointing 
safety distances ignored (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
 
Accident report 
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date was in a UNMACA 
accident summary. The conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting 
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being lost.  Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised as more 
information becomes available. 
The summary is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
 
Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA) 
File: OPS/14/01-11: Ref: 09,06,199 
Date: June 30, 2009 
INVESTIGATION REPORT & LESSONS LEARNED OF [Demining group] DT-18 DEMINING 
ACCIDENT IN KANDAK-E- 921 SARHADI AREA, KOSAN DISTRICT OF HERAT 
PROVINCE  
Attached please find the investigation report and Lessons Learned from the demining 
accident, occurred to [Demining group] DT-18 on 09 June 2009 at 07.55 hours in Kosan 
district of Herat Province.  
 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DT- 18 DEMINING ACCIDENT 
INTRODUCTION: 
An investigation team was convened by AMAC West to investigate the demining accident 
involving [Victim No.1]  and [Victim No.2] the Deminers from [Demining group] DT-18. The 
accident occurred at 7:55 hours on 09 June 2009 at minefield number 
AF12008/003241H4533-8, located in Kandak-e-921 Sarhadi area, Kohsan district of Herat 
province. 
SUMMARY: 
AF/2008/00324/H4533-13 is an anti-personnel mine contaminated area laid by the 
government forces during the Russian invasion in Afghanistan. The mines are laid in 2 rows 
as a belt surrounding Kandak-e-921 Sarhadi in order to secure their positions from the attacks 
of Mujahedeen. [Demining group] DT-18 was tasked for the clearance of mentioned area, on 
9th of June 2009 at 07:55 am deminer [Victim No.1] was working in his clearance lane 
excavating a detected signal, his prodder touched a mine and caused it to explode. According 
to the investigation report the signal was not pinpointed correctly and the deminer has used 
his prodder directly on the top of mine, so the accident happened. As a result of accident 
[Victim No.1] got severe injures on his both eyes and face and lost his right eye completely, 
because his visor was up during the operation. Another deminer named [Victim No.2] was 
also injured in this accident, because of being in a close proximity to [Victim No.1]. [Victim 
No.2] was carrying some painted rocks for marking purpose. He has also got injuries on his 
face. The command group was failed to control and stop them. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
As it seems, the carelessness of victim deminer and poor supervision are the contributing 
factors to this accident, but it is a management problem that a demining team is working on a 
mine belt, without considering safety procedures at all i.e. not using PPEs, not considering 
safety distance and lack of command and control. It means the performance of team has not 
been evaluated by the operations department. 
RECOMMENDATIONS: 
The following points are to be considered: 
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[Demining group] operations department is requested to present their management solution 
for such accidents in the future and provide MACCA OPS department with written documents 
by no later than 5th of July 09. 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 815 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: severe Eye, severe Face 
AMPUTATION/LOSS, Eye Right 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 816 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Not recorded 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: severe Face 
COMMENT: Facial injuries. No Medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because Victim 
No.1 was working with his visor raised and his error was not corrected. Victim No.2 was close 
by (with no visor) and so breaching IMAS recommended working distances (10m in an AP 
blast mine area). The secondary cause is listed as a Management Control Inadequacy 
because the investigators identified “poor supervision” as a main cause and it is the senior 
management’s responsibility to ensure that appropriately trained, experienced and 
responsible field managers are in place. 
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident 
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years 
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in contravention of the requirements of the IMAS. The existence of a good summary implies 
that the Afghan investigators carried out a professional investigation and generated a detailed 
report that should be shared. 
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